Profile
| Keywords: | Electricity, Climate Policy, Energy Transitions |
FES Funded ProjectsOutputs
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| Why are Power Prices so Darn High?University of Calgary School of Public Policy Energy and Environmental Policy TrendsT12-P05, T14-P03 University of Calgary, University of Alberta | Publication | 2022-04-20 | | | Evaluating the Impact of Divestitures on Competition: Evidence from Alberta's Wholesale Electricity MarketThis article has been accepted and is in-press at the International Journal of Industrial Organization. T12-P05, T14-P03 University of Alberta, University of Calgary | Publication | 2023-04-17 | | | Centralized versus Decentralized Demand Response: Evidence from a Field ExperimentSeminar presentation to the University of Alberta's Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology. T12-P05, T06-C01 University of Alberta, University of Calgary | Activity | 2023-03-17 | | | Alberta’s Renewable Electricity Program: Design, Results, and Lessons LearnedWe present a case study and analysis of Alberta's Renewable Electricity Program, one of a suite of policies implemented between 2015 and 2019 to increase the share of renewable generation in the Canadian province's fossil-fuel-dominated electricity system. The program consisted of a series of reverse auctions for contracts-for-differences which provided successful proponents with a project-specific guaranteed price for power generation. We find that the Renewable Electricity Program was successful in three important ways. First, it contracted for new renewable generation at prices in the range of CA$30 to CA$43/MWh (US$23 to US$33/MWh), well below expectations and among the lowest procurement costs globally at the time. These contracts have resulted in gains to the government of CA$75.5 million (US$60 million) to date. Second, the program ushered new entrants into Alberta's power market, including through mandated Indigenous equity participation in one round of auctions. Third, we find that price discovery and the incentive to develop new projects provided by the program spurred privately-financed development. While the program was a success, we argue that its design did not adequately reward high-value generation, which could have become an issue in future auction rounds. We analyse design alternatives that would have improved the program's dynamic efficiency.T06-P05 University of Alberta, University of Calgary | Publication | 2022-12-01 | |
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